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COMMENTS
TO NOTARIZE, OR NOT TO NOTARIZE...
IS NOT A QUESTION OF JUDGING
COMPETENCE OR WILLINGNESS OF
DOCUMENT SIGNERS
KLINT L. BRUNO*
"Without full knowledge of his powers, obligationsand limitations, a
notary public may be a positive danger to the community in which he
is licensed to act." Chief Judge Charles S. Desmond (1963) 1
INTRODUCTION
The following facts are true: 85 year old Ida Gorodetsky suffered a stroke, was partially paralyzed and admitted to a hospital.
Her condition was described as impaired of hearing, confused,
drowsy, occasionally unresponsive, semi-comatose, uncooperative
and at times she was restrained for her own safety. While hospitalized, an agent of a nursing home visited Ida. Ida agreed to sign
a life care contract with the nursing home that included a provision gifting to the home any and all of her estate remaining at the
time of her death.2 If you were a notary and were asked to notarize
Ida's signatureon that contract, would you?
Notaries are frequently confronted with difficult and sensitive
documents and circumstances and required to decide whether they
Should a notary be required to
will notarize such transactions

* J.D. Candidate, 1999. Notary Public, State of Illinois.

1. C.J. CHARLES S. DESMOND, SKINNER'S NOTARY MANUAL, foreword (3d
ed. 1963).
2. Gordon v. Bialystoker Ctr. and Bikur Cholim, Inc., 385 N.E.2d 285, 286
(N.Y. 1978). The facts contained in the hypothetical are based on the facts of
this case, even though no notary was actually called to notarize the bedside
transaction in the actual case. Id. Throughout this Comment, similar cases
are cited and a notary is placed in a similar hypothetical situation. All of the
facts contained in these hypothetical situations are based on the facts of actual cases. In the conclusion of the paper, the hypothetical questions posed
throughout are answered.
3. Marc A. Birenbaum, Protecting Your Invaluable Journal, NAT'L
NOTARY MAG., Nov. 1997, at 12. The author specifically states that a notary's
testimony could become critical when a signature was notarized under undue
1013
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judge such difficult issues as a document signer's competence or
willingness? There is a great deal of uncertainty and disagreement on this most fundamental issue.4
On one hand, many individuals believe that notaries do, in
fact, have a duty to judge the willingness or competence of document signers.5 Accordingly, a recent survey of notaries revealed
that most of those questioned concluded notaries have an affirmative duty to determine the competency and willingness of document signers appearing before them. Among the group of notaries
surveyed, about 65% held the view that notaries bear the responsibility to assess the competency of document signers, and 75%
concluded that notaries should determine a signer's willingness.7
Further, the National Notary Association's semi-final draft of the
Notary Public Code of Professional Responsibility states, "The Notary shall require the presence of each signer, oath-taker and witness, and carefully screen each for identity, willingness and competence."" In addition, the President of the National Notary
Association has been quoted as saying that notaries must "verify
the identity, willingness, and general competence of each document signer."9
influence or made by someone who is incompetent. Id.
4. See infra notes 13-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differing opinions regarding whether notaries should undertake to judge competence or willingness of document signers.
5. See Poole v. Hyatt, 689 A.2d 82, 90 (Md. 1997) (stating clearly that a
notary is under an obligation to judge both the competence and willingness of
those signers appearing before the notary). See also NOTARY PUB. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 2 (Semi-final draft Mar. 1, 1998) (declaring
notaries have a duty to make general observations of document signers and
determine from those observations whether the signers are competent and
willing to enter into the agreement that they want notarized).
6. Survey conducted by Michael L. Closen at the National Notary Association Annual Conference, Atlantic City, New Jersey, Aug. 20, 1997
[hereinafter Survey]. The survey posed the questions: "Does a notary have a
duty to judge the competence of document signers?" and "Does a notary have a
duty to judge the voluntariness of document signers?". Of those responding to
the survey, 50% responded that notaries do have an affirmative duty to judge
competence of document signers appearing before them. Id. Conversely, 48%
responded that notaries did not have such an affirmative duty. Id. The results of the survey do not equal 100% because some of those surveyed did not
respond or did not have an opinion on a particular question. Id.
7. Id.
8. See NOTARY PUB. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note

5, at 2 (noting specifically that a notary has an obligation to judge the competence and willingness of document signers).
9. Milton G. Valera, America's Notaries: Ever Faithful and True, WALL
ST. J., July 26, 1993, at 3. The president of the National Notary Association
expressed his disappointment in an article previously published. Id. In his
response, he declared that notaries are under a duty to "serve as impartial
witnesses,... [and] verify the identity, willingness and general competence of
each document signer." Id. See also It's a Proud Calling,But the Notary's Lot
Is Full of Indignities, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at 1 (noting the general di-
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Additional support for the position that notaries should judge
competence and willingness can be found in the recent decision of
Maryland's highest court which ruled that notaries must judge
willingness and competence of document signers. The court held
that a signatory appearing before a notary must "be alert and under no apparent duress or undue emotional or intoxicating influence."" The court also held that the circumstances surrounding
the notarization must indicate that the signatory understands the
nature of the instrument. 1 These examples constitute a representative sampling of the array of support for the conclusion that notaries must judge competence and willingness of signers appearing
before those notaries.
On the other hand, a diligent search of other sources reveals
an almost complete absence of authority for the proposition that
notaries are to evaluate competency or willingness.'" For example,
in spite of the Maryland Court of Appeals holding, a thorough
search of the Maryland Notary Statute discloses that the statute
imposes no such duty. 4 A careful reading of the statute clearly
shows that the drafters did not even mention willingness or competence of document signers or any comparable terms." Only one
state has enacted a statute that expressly directs notaries to judge
competence and willingness of document signers.' 6 Further, in the
survey previously mentioned, lawyers overwhelmingly concluded
that notaries do not determine competency. 17 Approximately 67%
of attorneys responded in the negative, while only about 30%
opined that notaries do judge competence.
lution of the notary profession due to the vast number of notaries and the ease

with which people can become notaries).
10. Poole, 689 A.2d at 89-90. This landmark decision declares for the first

time that notaries have a duty to judge both the competence and willingness
of document signers. Id. at 90.
11. Id. The court held that when the overall circumstances surrounding
the signer's actions indicate that he understood the nature of the document
and is appearing and signing voluntarily, the signer is presumed to have understood the subject matter of the document and have signed it willingly. Id.
12. Id.
13. Interview with Michael L. Closen, Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Ill. (Oct. 15, 1997).
14. MD. ANN. CODE art. 68, §§ 1-13 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
15. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 68, § 1-13 (1995 & Supp. 1996)

(showing that no duty to judge competence or willingness is enumerated in
the notary statute).
16. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-1 to -34 (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996).

17. Survey of attorneys randomly selected from various parts of the country by the author during Sept. and Oct. 1997. The survey showed that 30% of
attorneys believe that notaries have a duty to judge competence and willingness, while 67% believe they do not. Id. Additionally, 48% of the attorneys

surveyed believed that notaries must determine willingness of signers, with
45% contending otherwise. Id.
18. Id.
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The most persuasive evidence of confusion and disagreement
about the issue of the role of the notary arises from the almost
evenly divided opinions of some groups polled. 9 Among law students, approximately 49% favored the view that a notary must
judge competence of document signers, while about 51% concluded
otherwise. ° On the issue of judging the willingness of signers,
roughly 52% of law students thought notaries should do so, but
48% believed that notaries should not.2' Similarly, some 48% of
lawyers held the opinion that notaries should determine voluntariness of document signers, while some 45% took the opposite
position. 2
Thus, a sharp conflict exists regarding whether a notary is legally required to judge a signer's willingness or competence." According to Chief Judge Desmond, quoted above, this type of uncertainty with regard to a notary's actual power and authority could
be dangerous to the community that the notary is supposed to
serve. 4 The notary does the community a disservice if the notary
is not certain of the exact duties and responsibilities of the Office.25
Indeed, a notary may mislead the general public by leaving people
with false or inflated views of the reliability of notarized documents. 26 As evidenced by the survey results announced above, different groups of people, including notaries themselves, maintain
vastly different opinions of the actual functions of notaries. 7 Con19. Survey of law students at The John Marshall Law School conducted
during Sept. and Oct. 1997. The results of this survey show that 49% of law
students believe that notaries have an affirmative duty to judge competence of

document signers, while 51% believe to the contrary. Id. Additionally, this
student survey reveals that 52% of law students believe that notaries should
judge voluntariness of document signers, with 48% thinking otherwise. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Survey, supra note 17 (stating the percentage of lawyers who indi-

cated whether notaries should determine willingness and competence of
document signers).

23. Compare Poole v. Hyatt, 689 A.2d 82, 89 (Md. 1997) (stating that an
affirmative duty exists for notaries to judge competence and willingness of
document signers appearing before the notaries), with MD. ANN. CODE art.
68, § 1-13 (1995 & Supp. 1996) (delineating no duty for notaries to judge either willingness or competence).
24. See DESMOND, supra note 1, at 1.

25. See id. (stating specifically that notaries do not do the community any
service if the notaries do not know their exact duties).
26. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

varying opinions regarding whether notaries should be judging competence
and willingness of document signers.
27. Gillian Shaw Vansun, Strata Council Should Get Insurance, VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 21, 1995, at C8. The article stated that a person must be

mentally competent in order to execute a power of attorney. Id. In order for
someone to prove mental competence, the person must adequately portray

competency to a doctor, lawyer or notary. Id. The article does not state any
criteria used to determine competency. Id. See also Don't Notarize If Signer
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sequently, because of uncertainty about the tasks that they are to
perform, effective education and training of notaries is rendered
virtually impossible. In order to promote uniformity of notary
practice and reliability of notarized documents, the question of
whether notaries are required to determine willingness or competence of document signers must be resolved.
This Comment reviews whether the notary public has an affirmative duty to determine willingness or competence of document signers. Part I begins by discussing the relevant history and
background of notaries and the role they play in notarizing documents. Secondly, Part II analyzes the state statutes governing notary law to determine whether any provisions expressly or impliedly require a notary to judge willingness or competence. This
Comment next examines case law to identify whether the common
law imposes any such duties on notaries. Thereafter, this Comment evaluates other possible sources of authority which could
confer upon notaries the duty to judge competence or willingness
of signers. Additionally, this Comment considers whether, as a
policy matter, such duties should be assigned to notaries. Finally,
this Comment proposes amendments to the Model Notary Act as
well as the Codes of Ethics of the National Notary Association and
the American Society of Notaries.'
I.

HISTORY OF NOTARY LAW

The following facts are true: 75 year old George Shea had a
long history of alcoholism, arteriosclerosis, cirrhosis of the liver,
and arthritis of the spine and hip. These conditions altered
George's normal functioning both physically and mentally. When
George began experiencing extreme financial difficulties, he
agreed to sell some of his real property to his long-time physician
at a fraction of its market value. The physician had appropriate
Is Not Competent, NOTARY BULL., Apr. 1995, at 11 (directing notaries not to

notarize documents for those people that the notaries believe incompetent).
The article also directs the notary to "be sure every signer acts with fall understanding and freedom of will." Id. In order to determine whether the
signer understands the document, the article instructs notaries to draw the
signers into a simple conversation. Id. This article advised notaries to question the signer out of the presence of relatives to determine whether the
signer is being coerced. Id.
28. See infra notes 193-199 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
proposed amendments. It also should be noted that this comment focuses on
the notary's duties, or lack thereof, pertaining to document signers and does
not consider any other notary functions. Additionally, notaries may perform a
variety of duties other than attesting to the validity of a signature. For example, some of these duties may include demanding payment of foreign and
inland bills of exchange. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8205 (West 1992). Notaries may
also memorialize other official actions such as marriages. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
117.04 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). This Comment does not address any of
these issues in any detail.
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provisions drawn and wished to execute the contract for George's
land.n If you were a notary and were asked to notarize George's
signatureon that contract, would you do so?
Section A of this Part discusses the number of notaries nationwide and the lack of educational and testing requirements for
becoming a notary. Section B outlines what purpose a notary is to
serve.
A. Number of Notaries and EducationalRequirements
Fourteen of the fifty states are home to more than 100,000 notaries each. ° In total, there are more than 4 million notaries in
the United States today.3' These statistics reflect the relative ease
with which one can become a notary. To become a notary, one
must merely apply to the appropriate governmental agency, 2 pay
a small fee, 3 reside in the particular state, 4 and await one's commission.
Generally, to have the notary commission granted, individuals must be of "legal age, citizens of the state, and persons of good
moral character."" However, beyond these basic criteria, very few
states provide for any education or mandatory training of prospective notaries." Even in the few states which require some train29. Hodge v. Shea, 168 S.E.2d 82, 84 (S.C. 1969). The facts in this hypothetical are the actual facts from this case although in the case no notary was
actually called to notarize the transaction. Id.
30. States with Notary Populations of 100,000 or More, NOTARY BULL.,
June 1996, at 1. States with more than 100,000 notaries include Florida,
Texas, New York, South Carolina, Illinois, Massachusetts, California, Ohio,
Georgia, North Carolina, Michigan, Virginia, Tennessee, and New Jersey. Id.
31. Michael L. Closen, Why Notaries Get Little Respect, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9,
1995, at A24. According to this piece, the number of notaries in this country
is probably too high. Id.
32. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-20-30 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-311
(1992); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8200 (West .1992); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 130
(McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992) (noting the proper governmental agency with
which to file an application to become a notary).
33. EDWARD MILLS JOHN, JOHN'S AMERICAN NOTARY AND COMMISSIONER
OF DEEDS MANUAL 7 (6th ed. 1951). This manual states that the fee paid
when trying to obtain the notary commission is usually to meet the bonding
requirements of the state. Id.
34. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 5.1041 (West 1991) (proclaiming
that a notary must be a resident' of the county and a citizen of the state where
he or she desires appointment).
35. See JOHN, supra note 33, at 7-8 (outlining the general criteria that need
must be satisfied in order for one to become a notary in most of the fifty
United States).
36. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 36-20-1 to -32 (1991); ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.50.010.190 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.- §§ 41-311 to -317 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-14-101 to -205. (Michie 1996 & Supp.
1996); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8200-8230 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-55-101 to -123, 12-55-201 to -211 (West 1996); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3-91 to -95a, 7-33a (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN.
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ing, the course is usually quite rudimentary. 7 Of the states that
require some training, none offers effective guidance that would
aid notaries in determining whether a signer appearing before the
notary was competent and willing to sign.& Hence, a notary is
likely to be a lay person who has met the minimal statutory requirements of the office and paid a nominal licensing fee without
any prior training or experience to judge competence or willingness of document signers.39 Further, even the states that require
some education or training prior to granting a notary's commission

tit. 29, §§ 4301-4401 (1991 & Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-180 to -817
(1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 117.01-.108 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-17-1 to -34 (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 456-6 to -18 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 51-1-1 to -123

(1994); 5 ILCS 312/1-101 to 8-104 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-16-1-1 to -8-5 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 586.1
(West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-101 to -401 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 423.010-.990 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35:1-:555
(West 1985 & Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 951-958 (West 1989
& Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE art. 68, §§ 1-13 (1995 & Supp. 1996); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 222, §§ 1-11 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 5.1041-.1072 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
359-01 to -12 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 25-33-1 to -23
(1991 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 486-100 to -595 (West 1995 & Supp.
1997); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-5-201 to -611 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 64-101
to -215 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 240.001-.330 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 455:1-:15 (1992 & Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:7-10 to 21 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-21-1 to -20 (Michie

1995); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 6-130 to -138 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 10A-1 to -16 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 44-06-01 to -14 (1993
& Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 147.01-.14 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 &
Supp. 1996); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 49, §§ 1-121 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 194.005-.990 (1991); 57 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-169 (West
1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-30-1 to -15 (1993 & Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN.
88 26-1-10 to -120 (Law Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 18-1-1 to -14 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-16-101 to -309 (1994);
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 406.001-.024 (West 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-11 to -19 (1993 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 441-446 (1992); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 47.1-1-33 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 42.44.010-.903 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 29-4-1 to -16
(1992 & Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 137.01 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996);
WYO. STAT. §§ 32-1-101 to -113 (Michie 1996).
37. Only six of the fifty states have statutory provisions that require any
sort of training or testing prior to receiving the notary commission. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 8201 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 946
(West 1988 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35:191 (West 1995 & Supp.
1996); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 6-130 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1OA-4 (1991); 57 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 151 (West 1996).
38. See generally N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 6-130 to -139 (McKinney 1993 & Supp.
1996) (failing to mention the words competence or willingness or any similar
language that couldbe used in screening document signers).
39. Comparisonof State Notary Provisions,NAT'L NOTARY MAG., May 1996,

at 32. The article notes that every state charges a commissioning fee ranging
from $3 to $72. Id. The average commissioning fee is $26.91. Id.
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have no requirement for continuing education. ° Similarly, no
state requires any type of retraining for notaries wishing to renew
their commissions. 4' Few states require notaries to submit to any
kind of examination on notary ethics, law, or practice, and no state
imposes a testing requirement for renewal of a notary commission.
The relative ease of obtaining and keeping a notary commission
has led to exponential growth in the number of notaries commissioned each year.4 ' The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged this by observing that "the significance of the position
has necessarily been diluted by changes in the appointment process and by the wholesale proliferation of notaries.""
B. The Notary's Duties
In the United States today, every state and territory recog4
nizes that a notary is vested with certain powers and authority. '
The office of notary is a creation of statute, and the notary's conduct, powers and duties are granted almost exclusively by statute. 4' General oversight of notary conduct and regulation of the
notary is performed by the state's notary licensing agency.4 Thus,
the notary is not considered an officer of the court 47 because the
court has almost no control over the notary's commission.4 Pre40. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35:1-:555 (West 1985 & Supp.

1996) (failing to mandate any type of continuing educational requirements after notaries receive their commissions).
41. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8200-8230 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996)
(omitting any requirement for retraining or re-testing of notaries after their
commission has expired).
42. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 234 (1984). The United States Su-

preme Court highlighted the fact that because of the modern statutory
changes, the number of notaries licensed has had a detrimental effect on the

significance and importance of notaries. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 36-20-1 to -32 (1991) (detailing the statutory

provisions governing notaries in Alabama).
45. Interview, supra note 17.
46. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.50.010-.090 (Michie 1989) (explaining the

provisions that govern notary conduct in Alaska).
47. See Bevan v. Krieger, 289 U.S. 459, 462 (1933) (explaining that a notary

public may hold a witness in contempt of court by virtue of his position as an
officer of the court). This is the only case that gives notaries the ability to
hold a witness in contempt of court. Id.
48. See Patterson v. Dept. of State, 312 N.Y.S.2d 300, 303 (N.Y. App. Div.
1970) (noting that the Secretary of State is responsible for disciplinary action
taken against a notary). See also Michael L. Closen & G. Grant Dixon III, Notaries Public From the Time of the Roman Empire to the United States Today,
and Tomorrow, 68 N.D. L. REV. 873, 882 (1992) (noting that notaries need to

be distinguished from court reporters, although court reporters are almost
always notaries). In a situation where a notary holds an individual in con-

tempt in a court proceeding, although the notary is a court reporter, the notary is also acting in the capacity of notary and applying the powers which
have been granted by the court. Id.
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dominantly, the agency in charge of overseeing notarial conduct
merely enforces the statutory guidelines provided by the legislature.49
It is said that the office of the notary is "indispensable to
modem business.""' One of the functions of the notary that makes
the notary indispensable to modern business is verification of the
identity of document signers.5 When a notary attests to a signature on a document by notarizing the document, a third party can
reasonably rely on the notarized signature.52 By verifying the signature on a document, the notary assures the third party that the
person who signed the document was who he or she claimed to
be."3 In today's global environment where an inordinate amount of
business is transacted from considerable distances, it is easy to see
how a notary can play a vital role in verifying signatures contained
within documents.' The notarization both verifies the signature
on the document and identifies the signer."
49. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:7-11 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996)
(explaining that the Secretary of State, acting on behalf of the governor, is the
appropriate authority governing notaries in the state).
50. RICHARD B. HUMPHREY, AM. NOTARY MANUAL 9 (4th ed. 1948). This
source highlights the fact that a notary's services are essential to business
transactions. Id. If the office of the notary was eliminated, some type of
authenticating authority would need to be created in order for business to be
transacted. Id.
51. See Closen & Dixon, supra note 48, at 883-84. Ordinarily, a person appears before a notary with a document that he or she needs signed in the
presence of a notary. Id. The notary identifies the person as who the signer
claims to be, either by personal knowledge or by certain forms of identification
as provided by statute. Id. The person then signs the document in the notary's presence. Id. Finally, the notary attaches his or her notarial seal or
stamp to the document. Id. In addition to the seal or stamp, the notary is
also required to sign and date the document so as to formally witness the
signer's act. Id.
52. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-5-417 (1995) (eliminating some of the parties
for whom a notary may act to preserve the integrity of the notarization).
53. HUMPHREY, supra note 50, at 10. Although the notary performs many
functions, none of these functions becomes effective until the notary affixes
his official seal or certificate. Id.
54. Closen & Dixon, supra note 48, at 884-85. Although the actual signing
of a document was not witnessed by one of the parties, the notary can verify
that the particular party did in fact sign the document. Id. at 884. For example, if a party to a contract was a substantial distance from another party
to the contract, each party could have its signature notarized on the contract.
This notarization would provide all parties to the contract with some reassurance that they could rely on that particular instrument and proceed with their
plans to perform under the contract. See also HUMPHREY, supra note 50, at
11 (declaring that "[tihe purpose of authentication is to render the instrument
available as evidence of its own contents, without further proof of its execution, or to entitle it to public record"). In order to accomplish this goal, the
notary identifies the person who signed the instrument and verifies that the
signature is that of the person who signed. Id.
55. HUMPHREY, supra note 50, at 7.
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Even absent the parties being separated by a great distance, a
notary serves to authenticate signatures on documents and enables third parties to comfortably rely on the fact that the signer
was identified by a party with no interest in the transaction.56 The
notary is an agent of the public at large and does not represent any
particular party in a specific transaction. 7
A notary's duties are clerical or ministerial by nature, 58 and
few notaries function in that capacity as their principal occupations.5 9 Their ministerial and occasional notarial role does not
equip them to judge competence or willingness. °
Notaries are "fiduciar[ies] of the public" who should perform
their duties "with competence, diligence and integrity."6' In order
to perform the duties of the office of the notary with the characteristics outlined above, notaries need direction to dictate what they
should and should not do.6" Because the notary did not exist at the
common law, 3 the notary is primarily guided by the various statutes that establish the office and govern notarial conduct. 4 These
56. Id. The American Notary Manual gives the commonly accepted definition of a notary as follows: "The notary public is a public officer whose duty it
is to attest the genuineness of any deeds or writings in order to render them
available as evidence of the facts therein stated." Id. The notary is an agent
or trustee of the public and is considered a public officer whose sole purpose is
serving the common good. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 8. The notary has little or no discretion in the performance of his
official duties. Id.
59. Id. at 14-16. Most notaries are clerks, bank tellers, secretaries, insurance agents, and so forth. Id. Few notaries serve in that capacity as their
sole occupation. Id. Nearly all states expressly provide that notaries may
hold other official public offices while retaining their status as notaries. Id.
60. Id. The American Notary Manual specifically states that most, if not
all, notaries function as notaries as a sidelight to another profession or occupation. Id.
61. HUMPHREY, supra note 50, at 7. Ideally, the notary would live up to
the expectations of the office which he or she holds. Id. In reality, however,
the notary usually does not achieve these expectations due to a lack of the
previously mentioned traits. Id.
62. See Interview, supra note 17. Professor Closen teaches a course that
deals with notary law. Id. Professor Closen noted that notaries have a number of authorities that contradict each other in outlining a notary's general
duties. Id. However, he stressed that, when in doubt, the ultimate authority
governing a notary's conduct should be the statutes that create the notary's
office. Id.
63. Kirksey v. Bates, 7 Porter 529, 530. This case states that if a statute
creates an office that was known to the common law, then that statute just
codifies and gives legal recognition to that office. Id. See also Crain v. United
States, 25 Ct. Cl. 204, 230 (1890) (noting that if the duties of an office are not
clearly enumerated by a statute, other sources must be considered to locate
the exact powers and authorities of a given office).
64. See generally TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-16-101 -309 (1993 & Supp. 1996)
(outlining in general terms the duties and obligations of the office of notary
public).
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statutes govern notaries' actions by outlining the notary's duties
and regulating their conduct; thus, notaries must abide strictly by
those statutes .
In order to achieve order in commerce, government, and elsewhere, courts have created the standard of care or "uniform standard of behavior."66 This standard is meant to provide guidelines
for individuals to follow and for judging the conduct of people.6"
The standard created by the courts to apply to a given situation is
the standard of the "reasonable and prudent person" under like
circumstances.' The reasonable and prudent person standard is
employed in virtually every situation. 9
The standard of care for a notary is that of a reasonably prudent notary in a similar situation.0 The substance of the standard
of conduct is derived from the various statutes that create the office of the notary.7'1 These statutes serve as a notary's standard of

65. See id. (giving one example how a notary statute delineates the powers
and authorities of the office).
66. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

32, at 173 (5th ed. 1984). Because of the number of possible situations, a concrete standard is not practicable. Id.
67. Id. at 174. The best possible solution for the difficulty in obtaining a
standard of care is to devise some type of formula. Id. Due to the many different variables which can enter the equation, this formula must be flexible
enough to accommodate a number of different circumstances. Id. The formula, however, must also be rigid enough to provide some sort of guidance as
to what the standard really is or should be. Id. The standard must also be
objective and not subject to judgments. Id.
68. See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (1837) (noting for the
first time that a standard of care in an action for negligence is that of the
idealized "man of ordinary prudence"). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 66,
at 173 (declaring that this idealized person has never existed, and the courts
are charged with the very difficult duty of applying the standard of care of
this fictitious person). The model person is "[a] model of all proper qualities,
with only those human shortcomings and weaknesses which the community
will tolerate on the occasion. . .

."

Id.

69. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 66, at 175 (noting that although a person may be mentally deranged and incompetent, the person will still be held
to the standard of care of an ordinary reasonably prudent person). Public
policy dictates that the rule should be applied in this way. Id. There is a
great deal of difficulty in determining whether a person is mentally competent
in criminal cases where guilt depends on the defendant's ability to understand
the charges against him. Id. Because of this difficulty, courts have been opposed to allowing this mental capacity doctrine to enter into the civil arena.
Id. One major problem that would result from this would be the difficulty in
determining whether someone was capable of making a decision or whether
that person's decision was merely poor judgment. Id.
70. See Naquin v. Robert, 559 So.2d 18, 20 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (declaring
the standard for a notary to be that of a reasonably prudent notary in the
same community).
71. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 423.010-.990 (Michie 1992) (listing the
duties, powers, obligations, and responsibilities of the office of notary public).
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minimum conduct.72 For example, if a notary acts negligently in
identifying a document signer, then the notary will have breached
the duty of reasonable care to any third person who relied upon
the notarization of an impostor's signature.73 The standard to
which the notary is held in such an instance is delineated in the
guidelines that the legislature established to identify document
signers.74 Therefore, if a plaintiff shows that a notary has not
maintained this standard,75 then a notary is liable to the plaintiff
for all injuries proximately caused by that breach of care. 6
In order for a notary to honor the standard of reasonable care,
the notary is entitled to know the responsibilities of the office.
Does the function of the notary involve a determination of the
competence and willingness of document signers? With only two
or three exceptions, the states have not established that a determination of competence and willingness falls within the duties of
notaries.77 Therefore, notaries must follow the law that governs
their office, and most notaries are not to judge the competence or
willingness of document signers.

II. ANALYSIS
The following facts are true: Carolyn Ann Williamson suffers
from early organic brain syndrome which is a form of permanent
mental weakness. She also has a long history of alcoholism which
has caused emotional problems. The Matthews learned that
Carolyn Ann desired to sell her home because the mortgagee was
threatening to foreclose on the property. The parties reached an
agreement to sell the property for $1800, although it was ap-78
praised at $16,500 and Carolyn Ann had $10,000 in equity in it.

72. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 455:1-:15 (1992 & Supp. 1995)

(enumerating the steps that a notary should take to perform the duties of the
office with the requisite degree of care).
73. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 462 P.2d 814 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1969).

74. See id. (holding an employer liable for the notarial misconduct of an
employee). See also Karla Elliott, Notary's Misconduct is the Employer's Liability, Too!, NAT'L NOTARY MAG., May-June 1996, at 6 (exposing the fact that
an employer can be held directly liable for the notaries' misconduct).
75. See Michael L. Closen & R. Jason Richards, Notaries Public Lost in Cyberspace, or Key Business Professionals of the Future?, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 703, 725 (1997) (noting that the burden of proof for
showing a notary's misconduct rests with the plaintiff).
76. See id. at 725-26 (noting that a notary is almost always liable for
"negligent, reckless or willful conduct").
77. See infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
merits of whether notaries should be making judgments on the competence or
willingness of signers.
78. Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So.2d 1245, 1246-48 (Ala. 1980). The
facts in the hypothetical are the actual facts of this case, except for the fact
that no notary was called upon to notarize Ms. Williamson's signature in the
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If you were a notary and asked to notarize Carolyn Ann's signature
on this contract, would you do so?
Section A of Part II discusses the difficulty in defining
whether someone is competent or willing. Section B analyzes state
notary law statutes searching for a provision that conveys upon
notaries the duty to judge competence or willingness. Section C
examines case law to determine whether courts impose such a
duty on notaries. Section D evaluates other possible sources of
authority that might delineate such a duty for notaries.
A. Notaries'Difficulty Defining Competence and Willingness
Since some groups readily believe that a notary should make
determinations as to a document signer's competence and willingness,7 9 the terms themselves should first be defined. A search of
common sources such as Webster's New Riverside University Dictionary 8 and Black's Law Dictionary8' for an adequate definition of
willingness" or competence quickly proves futile. At best, the
definitions given by these two basic sources merely beg the questions: (1) What is competence and (2) What is willingness.8' Neither definition provides any real guidance or effective criteria upon
which to base a determination of competence or willingness.'
Likewise, a search of more scholarly sources provides little help in
outlining objective criteria which could be used for determining
general competence or willingness.8' Even leading psychological
actual case. Id.
79. See Survey, supra note 6 and accompanying text for the results of a
survey of a group of notaries who believe that they must determine competence and willingness of the document signers appearing before them.
80. WEBSTER'S NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 290 (Riverside
Pub. Co. 1984). Competence is defined as "properly qualified, adequate for the
stipulated purpose, legally fit." Id.
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 195 (6th ed. 1990). Competent is defined as

"duly qualified; answering all requirements; having sufficient capacity, ability
or authority; possessing the requisite physical, mental or legal qualifications;
able; adequate; suitable; sufficient; capable; legally fit." Id.
82. Id. at 1103. Willful is defined as "proceeding from a conscious motion

of the will; voluntary; knowingly; deliberate. Intending the result which actually comes to pass; designed; intentional; purposeful; not accidental or involuntary." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., SPENCER A. RATHUS, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY 397 (3d. ed.
1984) (defining competence as "knowledge of rules that guide conduct, concepts about ourselves and other people, and skills"); ANITA E. WOOLFOLK,
EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 268 (4th ed. 1990) (defining linguistic compre-

hension as "understanding the meaning of sentences"); BENJAMIN B.
WOLMAN, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, & NEUROLOGY 288 (1984) (outlining some general factors

used in determining social competence).

Some of those factors include: 1)

common general hygiene standards; 2) realistic views of one's self; 3) active
pursuit of social groups; 4) morality; 5) attention span; 6) critical thinking; 7)

1026

The John MarshallLaw Review

[31:1013

researchers differ in defining competence and willingness.8 Thus,
it seems unlikely that notaries can judge either or both of these
87
concepts where the definitions are replete with subjective terms.
Further complicating the already difficult determination of
competence is the fact that the legal standard of competence varies
depending on the type of transaction involved.' Courts require
individuals who desire to enter into any legal transactions to possess a certain minimum degree of mental functioning. 9 For example, one of the lowest standards for legal capacity is the legal
standard used to judge whether one can make a will." This test
merely requires that a party making a will be "of sound mind and
memory" when executing the document.9 1
One of the most commonly used tests is that used to determine contractual capacity.9 2 The test is whether a party can appreciate the consequences of his or her commercial or financial act
and sufficiently protect his or her own interests.9 3 These standards
for determining competence also have an effect on the determination of willingness. If one is considered incompetent to enter into
an agreement, it is unlikely that the individual could enter such an
agreement willingly, and vice versa.94 Thus, the definitions of
willingness and competence are inextricably tied and are neither
easily nor uniformly defined or understood.
In addition to the difficulty of defining willingness and competence, a notary often has but a few minutes to observe the document signer. 6 Also, in most instances, notaries do not have the
97
luxury of having any background information about the signer.
Medical professionals, lawyers, and judges sometimes debate the
very issue of a person's competence or willingness for months and

problem solving skills; and 8) general knowledge. Id.
86. WILLIAM CARROLL, ILL. MENTAL HEALTH PROF. LAW HANDBOOK, Mental Capacity To Perform Legal Acts 87, 88-89 (1993).

87. Id.
88. See id. (discussing the varying standards of legal competence required
to execute different instruments).
89. Id.
90. See In Re Estate of Anthony J. Sutera, 557 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Ill.
1976)
(declaring the requisite mental state for entering into a will to be a standard
"of sound mind and memory").
91. Id.
92. CARROLL, supra note 86, at 88. Professor Carroll claims that the test
for determining contractual capacity is the most frequently used. Id.
93. See People v. Kinion, 435 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (providing

the standard for determining contractual capacity).
94. See, e.g., Barth v. Gregory, 398 N.E.2d 849, 858 (Il1. App. Ct. 1979)
(stating the general test used in determining whether one is legally capable of
conveying property).

95. Id.
96. See Interview, supra note 17.

97. Id.
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sometimes years." Thus, the proposition that a notary could make
a competency or willingness determination within a matter of a
few minutes is unlikely.
B. Statutory Sources of Authority
•The notary is a governmentally-controlled official whose office
is created by statute." Every state in the United States has a notary statute.'0 Those statutes outline the responsibilities and duties of notaries and govern the general conduct of notaries within
each respective state.' °' A detailed reading of the various state notary statutes reveals that only the Georgia statute specifically addresses a notary's duty to judge competence and willingness."'
The relevant portion of the statute clearly proclaims that notaries
must judge both competence and willingness of signers. 1°3
The relevant portion of the Georgia statute reads as follows:
"No notary shall be obligated to perform a notarial act if he feels
such act is: ... [fMor a person who is being coerced, [or] [flor a person whose demeanor causes compelling doubts about whether the
person knows the consequences of the transaction requiring the
notarial act ... 1"°4However, the Georgia statute fails to outline
any criteria, either objective or subjective, on which the notary can
rely in making either of these determinations.' 0 5 Interestingly, the
Georgia notary statute does include a section that concedes what
typically reflects reality, the "notary [does not have] knowledge of
the contents of the document so signed. . . ."'0 As noted above, the
98. See CARROLL, supra note 86, at 88 (introducing the case law which de-

termines the varying standards of legal capacity).
99. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 359.01-12 (West 1991 & Supp.
1996) (outlining in detail the duties of a notary in that state).

100. See supra note 36 for a list of every state notary statute.
101. Id.
102. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-17-1 to -34 (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996). This
statute specifically states that notaries in Georgia are required to judge both
competence and willingness of document signers. Id. The Georgia Notary
Statute states as follows:
No notary shall be obligated to perform a notarial act if he feels such act
is: (1) For a transaction which the notary knows or suspects is illegal,
false, or deceptive; (2) For a person who is being coerced; (3) For a person whose demeanor causes compelling doubts about whether the per-

son knows the consequences of the transaction requiring the notarial
act ....

Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 45-17-8. This portion of the Georgia notary statute states specifically that the notary has no knowledge of the contents of the document that
he or she is notarizing. Id. Interestingly, this language indicates that the notary will not read the document which he is notarizing. Id. The notary apparently must merely rely on the document signers word when the signer tells
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standard of competence can change for different types of instruments.1 °7 Thus, a Georgia notary not only has to deal with the
challenge of determining competence and willingness, but also
must make that determination without knowing the document's
substance." If the notary does not know the contents of a document, it is unlikely that the notary could determine the level of
mental capacity needed to enter into such a document."° Curiously, the Georgia law does not direct a notary not to notarize, but
provides only that the notary has no obligation to perform a notarization if the signer's competence or willingness is in doubt. °
In the state of Washington, notaries are sometimes statutorily
required to judge the competence of document signers, though not
their willingness."' Although not specifically stated, it is implied
the notary what he or she needs notarized. Id. The relevant portion of the
statute reads as follows:
The signature of a notary public documenting a notarial act shall not be
evidence to show that such notary public had knowledge of the contents
of the document so signed, other than those specific contents which constituted the signature, execution, acknowledgment, oath, affirmation,
affidavit, verification, or other act which the signature of that notary
public documents, nor is a certification by a notary public that a document is a certified or true copy of an original document evidence to
show that such notary public had knowledge of the contents of the
document so certified.
Id.
107. CARROLL, supra note 87, at 88.
108. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-8 (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996).
109. Id. The notary has no knowledge of the contents of the document that
he or she is notarizing. Id. Therefore, the notary probably does not know
what standard of competence the signer must have in order for the signer to
enter into such a transaction. Id. The notary will have to rely solely on the
document signer's word in determining whether the document to be notarized
is what the signer claims it is. Id.
110. Id. The Georgia notary statute has the effect of confusing what reliance should be placed on notarized documents. The statute states that notaries are not required to perform a notarization, if the notary does not believe
that the signer is competent or appearing willingly. Id. This portion of the
statute does not direct notaries not to notarize documents for signers that the
notaries believe are incompetent or unwilling. Id. Notwithstanding the
evaluation of competence and willingness, this portion of the statute does not
promote uniformity of notary practice. As a result, third parties who rely on
notarizations cannot be sure of what value they should place on a notarization.
111. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.44.080 (West 1991). The relevant portion
of the Washington statute reads as follows:
In taking an acknowledgment authorized by RCW 64.08.100 from a person physically unable to sign his or her name or make a mark, a notary
public shall, in addition to other requirements for taking an acknowledgment, determine and certify from personal knowledge or satisfactory
evidence that the person appearing before the notary public is physically unable to sign his or her name or make a mark and is otherwise

competent. The notary public shall include in the acknowledgment a
statement that the signature in the acknowledgment was obtained un-
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that notaries must also make a determination about whether the
signer is willing in some limited circumstances. 1 2 The Washington
statute does not uniformly provide that notaries shall judge competence of document signers, 3 for the statute only requires notaries to make a competency judgment about those who are physically unable to sign for themselves."' Specifically, the statute
recites as follows: "a notary public shall ... determine and cer-

tify... that the person appearing before the notary public is
physically unable to sign his or her name or make a mark and is
otherwise competent.""' Although this statute separately provides
the notary with some instruction in making the determination that
the signer is physically incapable of signing, the statute does not
give any direction for the notary to determine competence.' 1' Further, the statute requires that the notary certify the disability of
the signer either from personal knowledge or satisfactory evidence.'1 7 Despite the requirement that the notary use personal
knowledge or satisfactory evidence to determine the disability, the
statute provides no guidance on the evidence required to make the
evaluation of competency."18 The fact that the statute requires notaries to judge the competency of only those unable to make a
mark leaves the impression that the drafters considered people
with disabilities as generally in need of such an evaluation. 9 Under the authority of RCW 64.08.100.
Id.
112. See supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
relationship between competence and willingness.
113. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.44.080 (West 1991).
114. Id.
115. Id. The Washington statute declares that notaries are to judge only the
competency of signers appearing before them who are physically unable to
sign their names or make a mark. Id. The statute specifically states that the

notary must not notarize the request if the signer is physically incapable of
signing, but the signer is otherwise competent. Id.

116. Id.
117. Id. This provision of the statute allows notaries to make observations
of signers appearing before the notaries and make the determination whether
or not the signer is physically disabled. Id. The provision allowing the notary
to use satisfactory evidence would allow the notary to use some type of medical evidence or any state adjudication of disability to make the determination.

Id.
118. Id. The statute goes into some detail in outlining what evidence a no-

tary can and should rely upon in determining whether a signer is disabled or
otherwise unable to make a mark. Id. However, these observations should be
relatively obvious and simple for the notary. Id. The drafters of the statute

did not choose to provide notaries with any evidence on how to make the determination of competence for the disabled. Id.
119. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.44.080 (West 1991). The fact that the
drafters singled out only the disabled for the competency determination leads

one to believe that the drafters thought people with disabilities the only group
worthy of such an evaluation. The evaluation fosters the prejudice that people who have a minor physical impairment also have some mental problem
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fortunately, such a requirement has a discriminatory
effect and
120
reinforces stereotypes about people with disabilities.
Having noted the only two exceptions, the other forty-eight
states, the District of Columbia, and the United States territories
have no statutory provisions charging notaries with the obligation
of judging competence or willingness of document signers.'' The
Model Notary Act and the Uniform Law on Notarial Acts do not
direct notaries to evaluate the competence or willingness of signers. 122 Correspondingly, no statute, including the statutes of
Georgia and Washington, defines or gives criteria for evaluating2
either competence or willingness in its state notary statute.1 1
Some states do, however, have notary statutes prohibiting a notary
from signing for someone known to have been adjudicated incompetent by a court."' 4 These states require notaries to rely on the
judgment of the court and do not force the notary into the difficult
position of making that determination."'
It is clear that state legislatures expressed no intention in the
language of the notary laws to direct notaries to determine competency or willingness of document signers except in Georgia and for
disabled signers in Washington."26 It appears equally clear that
legislatures did not impliedly suggest that notaries should under7
take to judge competence or willingness of signers."1
Instead, the
legislatures seem to have been concerned about identification of
document signers by notaries and about notary misconduct. 1'
Finally, many states have statutory provisions which provide
for the types of identification a notary may accept in verifying the
identity of the signer."
Many of the identification portions of
that is worthy of evaluation as well.
120. Id.

121. See supra note 36 for a list of the state notary law statutes.
122. MODEL NOTARY ACT §§ 1-101 to 8-103 (1984); UNIF. LAW ON NOTARIAL
ACTS §§ 1-13 (1983).
123. MODEL NOTARY ACT §§ 1-101 to 8-103 (1984); UNIF. LAW ON NOTARIAL
ACTS §§ 1-13 (1983).
124. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-94f (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT.

ANN. §§ 117.107, 117.05(b), 117.05(c) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-8
(Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 456-19 (1995); 5 ILCS
312/6-104 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-16-2-4 (Michie 1992
& Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 10A-3 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE

ANN. § 42.44.080(2) (West 1991).
125. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1OA-3 (1991) (stating that a notary can rely

upon the judgment of the court and should not notarize a document for someone who has been adjudicated incompetent).
126. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-8 (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.44.080 (West 1991).
127. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-8 (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996).
128. See Vincent Gnoffo, Notary Law and Practicefor the 21st Century: Suggested Modifications for the Model Notary Act, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1063,

1070 (1997) (discussing the potential for notarial misconduct).
129. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-14-111 (Michie 1996); CAL. GOV'T

CODE

§ 8230
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these statutes go into substantial detail
in explaining what types
0
of identifications a notary may accept.13
Many enacted provisions restrict, in some way, the parties for
whom notaries may notarize. 3 ' For example, some of these states
prohibit notaries from performing notarial acts for people with
whom the notary has some type of relationship. 132 Other states are
kind of financial interest
concerned that the notary not have some
3
in the transaction that is notarized.'
Thus, common threads running through the various legislation restricting notarizations seem to focus on identifying signers
and deterring misconduct."
Many legislatures have gone into
considerable detail in attempting to close loopholes and preserve

(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-55-205, 12-55-207 (1996);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4322 (1991 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
117.05(5) (West 1996); IDAHO CODE §§ 51-111 to -112 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53-107, 53-303 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 423.130 (Michie 1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-5-303, 1-5-603 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 64-203 (1990); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 240.163(7) (Michie 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-12-18
(Michie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 10A-6 to -8 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 49
§ 113A (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 194.515 (1991); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 406.014 (West 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 47.1-14 (Michie
1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.44.080(1) (West 1991).
130. See, e.g., 5 ILCS 312/6-102 (detailing the type of identification that a
notary may accept in identifying a document signer).
131. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-317 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 21-14-109 (Michie 1996); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8224-8225 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-55-110 (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 394 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. 1-1801 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 117.05(1)(e), (6)(e) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-17-8(c), -12 (Harrison
1990 & Supp. 1996); HAw. REV. STAT. § 456-14 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 51-108
(1994); 5 ILCS § 6-104 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-16-22
(Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 53-109 (1983); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 954(A)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1995); MD. ANN. CODE § 10 (1995 & Supp. 1996); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 5-1071 (Law. Co-op. 1993 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
486.255, .340(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-5-417
(1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 64-211 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 240.065
(Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 455:1 (1992 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 14-12-20 (Michie 1995); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 138 (McKinney 1993 &
Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-06-13.1 (1993 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 147.53 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §
194.100 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § R6-1-120 (Law. Co-op. 1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 46-1-8 (1993 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 47.1-30 (Michie 1996);
W.VA. CODE § 29-4-7 (1992 & Supp. 1996); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-113
(Michie 1996).
132. OR. REV. STAT. § 194.100 (1991). This statute prohibits a notary from
notarizing transactions for parties with whom the notary has a business relationship. Id.
133. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 53-109 (1983). This statute prohibits a notary from
notarizing transactions where the notary has a financial interest in the transaction. Id.
134. Id.
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the value of notarized documents."' Therefore, it seems highly
unlikely that these same legislatures drafted statutes that leave to
implication whether a notary has a13 6 duty to judge the competence
or willingness of document signers.
Ironically, at a time when notary statutes are becoming more
extensive, none of the state notary statues mention, much less explain, competence or willingness or how either standard should be
determined."' If the drafters of the statutes intended for notaries
to judge either concept, those legislatures would have included
such provisions in the statutes. 1 8 This is especially true in light of
the tremendous amount of attention paid by some statutes to the
relatively simple task of identifying someone."'
In sum, notaries are governed by statutes. The statutes that
establish the notaries' duties, with two exceptions, do not reference
any duty for notaries to judge competence or willingness.' 40 Therefore, because the statutes that ultimately outline a notary's functions do not expressly or impliedly establish the duty of notaries to
determine competence or willingness, notaries should not undertake to make such determinations.
C. Common Law Sources of Authority
Another possible source that could establish the legal duty of
a notary to make a determination of a document signer's competence or willingness is the common law. 14' The courts have the
authority and responsibility of interpreting the statutes propounded by state legislatures and deciding other questions on the
basis of general law and equity.14 2 Through the years, various
courts around the country have written opinions, some supporting,
but most undermining the proposition that notaries must judge
competence and willingness of document signers.14 3 However, none
135. See OR. REV. STAT. § 194.100 (1991) (discussing the legislative provisions that restrict parties for whom a notary can perform official acts).
136. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 53-109 (1983) (noting the specific language that

appears in the statute aimed at preventing a notary from having a personal
interest in a notarized document).
137. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 51-111 (1994) (outlining the notary's duty to

identify the document signer).
138. See GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-8 (Harrison 1990 & Supp. 1996) (stating

that notaries must judge both the competence and willingness of document
signers appearing before them).
139. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 406.014 (West 1990) (detailing the types of

identification that a notary may accept in verifying a document signer).
140. See supra note 36 for a list of the state notary law statutes.
141. See, e.g., Poole v. Hyatt, 689 A.2d 82, 89 (Md. 1997) (holding that notaries have an affirmative duty to judge both the competence and willingness of
signers appearing before them).

142. Id.
143. See Richard v. Smith, 361 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Ark. 1962) (commending
the notary for stating that if the notary had thought the signer to be incompe-
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of these decisions are as clear in holding that a notary has such a
duty as the recent decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Poole v. Hyatt.'" In this case, the court wrote as follows:
We hold that.., when a signatory (1) appears personally before a
notary for the purpose of having the notary witness and attest to his
signature, (2) the signatory appears to be alert and is under no apparent duress or undue emotional influence, (3) it is clear from the
overall circumstances that the signatory understands the nature of
the instrument he or she is about to sign, and (4) he or she signs the
instrument in the presence of the notary with the apparent intent of
making the instrument effective, the signatory is effectively acknowledging to the notary that the instrument45is being signed voluntarily and for the purpose contained therein.'
The Poole court relied on decisions from other states in
reaching its conclusion. 46 However, none of those cases specifically
considered a notary's duty to judge competence and willingness in
their reasoning. The court cites the case of McQuatt v. McQuatt"'
as reason for its holding.'" In McQuatt, a property conveyance
was challenged on the basis that the grantor was incompetent and
under undue influence.'" When the grantor was asked by the notent, then the notary would not have notarized the document for the signer);
Barouquet v. Barrieu, 148 So.2d 836, 839 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (placing a great
deal of weight on the notary's testimony at a trial which challenged the validity of a notarized transaction); Rayborn v. McGill, 159 So.2d 807, 808 (Miss.
1964) (relying on the notary's observations about a person's general competence to enter into a transaction); Schalla v. Roberts, 86 N.W.2d 5, 10 (Wis.
1957) (noting that the notary's official signature is presumptive evidence of
the facts contained within the document bearing that signature).
144. 689 A.2d 82 (Md. 1997).
145. Id. at 90. The facts from which the dispute in this case arose are
somewhat convoluted. Id. at 82-83. Ethyl Poole and her now deceased husband, N. Purdam, had built a home on some property which they owned. Id.
at 82. Some years later, they built a home for their son, Bernard. Id. When
N. Purdam died, Ethyl conveyed the property on which,both homes were built
to herself and her son Bernard as "joint tenants with the right of survivorship." Id. at 83. When Bernard's health began to fail, his wife, Glenda, decided to hire an attorney to prepare a durable power of attorney and a will.

Id. The attorney also notarized both documents. Id. In this will, Bernard left
his entire estate to Glenda.' Id. The power of attorney gave Glenda broad

power to manage Bernard's personal property. Id. A few months later,
Glenda, acting as Bernard's attorney in fact, conveyed Bernard's interest in
the property which he had held with Ethyl to Glenda as tenants by the entireties. Id. Three days later, Bernard died. Id.
146. Id. at 87-90.
147. 69 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1946).
148. Poole, 689 A.2d at 89.

149. McQuatt v. McQuatt, 69 N.E.2d 806, 808 (Mass. 1946). The children of
the grantor sued to set aside a deed claiming that the grantor was not competent to deed property and that the deed was coerced by the grantee. Id. The
deed was executed just hours before the grantor died. Id. The attorney who
prepared the deed had discussed the contents of the deed with the grantor on
a prior occasion, but the attorney was not present when the deed was signed.
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tary if he was aware of what he was about to do, the grantor replied, "Yes" and signed the conveyance.'
The court, however, invalidated the conveyance because the grantor did not make a formal 1statement
that the conveyance was undertaken of his free
51
will.

The Poole court also cited the case of Waitt Bros. Land, Inc. v.

Montange" for the proposition that one appearing before a notary
is presumably doing so on his or her own free will."' The Waitt
Bros. court declined to follow the form over substance doctrine and
held that this voluntary appearance constituted an admission 154
by
conduct and was evidence of a proper execution of a document.
The Poole court further relied on Lawson v. Lawson 155 in which the
parties appeared before a notary and signed the agreement in his
presence." 6 The notary did not inquire whether .the parties were
appearing voluntarily, but the Lawson court upheld the transaction."7 The Lawson court also reasoned that the signer's actions
were valid based on the appearance before the notary, even though
the signer did not specifically state the act was voluntary. 85
None of the cases the Poole court notes in support of imposing
a duty to judge competence and willingness of signers, however,
even mention any type of duty on the notary to determine either
competence or willingness."' In fact, some of the cases cited in
Id. The grantor signed the deed in the presence of the grantee and the notary
who then notarized the grantor's signature. Id. at 809.
150. Id. at 809.
151. Id. at 810. The court voided the deed because the grantor had not
made an acknowledgment that he was executing the deed freely and voluntarily. Id. The court relied on the fact that the grantor said absolutely nothing before, during, or after the notarization which indicated that the act was
performed of his own free will. Id.
152. 257 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa 1977).
153. Poole, 689 A.2d at 89. In Montange a notary went to an elderly couple's
home with a contract to sell their land. Waitt Bros., 257 N.W.2d at 518. The
wife signed both her and her husband's name, and the notary notarized the
document. Id. The couple challenged the suit for specific performance to sell
their property because the husband did not make a formal statement allowing
his wife to sign his name before the notary. Id.
154. Id. at 519. The court noted that the signer's appearance before the notary constituted an admission by silence when the husband did not then object
to his wife signing his signature. Id. The conduct before the notary can constitute an admission by silence because the signers are voluntarily appearing
for the purpose of having something notarized. Id.
155. 362 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. 1987).
156. Poole, 689 A.2d at 89.
157. Lawson, 362 S.E.2d at 270.

158. Id. The act of appearing before the notary and signing in his presence
is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that the signer acknowledge
the execution of whatever document he is having notarized. Id. at 272.
159. Waitt Bros. Land, Inc. v. Montange, 257 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa 1977);
Trowbridge v. Bisson, 44 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. 1950); Picetti v. Orcio, 67 P.2d 315
(Nev. 1937); Lawson v. Lawson, 362 S.E.2d 269 (N.C. 1987); McQuatt v.
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Poole inferentially undermine this holding. 160 The cases assume
that those signers appearing before a notary are doing so voluntarily, and thus, the challenged notarial acts are valid.' 6' By
making such assumptions, however, the courts have sanctioned
notarization of documents for anyone who stumbles in,or who is
intoxicated and appears before a notary and signs a document.162
Thus, notaries may authenticate signatures for anyone who complies with the statutory provisions on identification and personally
signs the document.'63 Conversely, Poole holds that a notary must
judge whether a signer is under "apparent duress or undue emotional or intoxicating influence."" Thus, the line of cases on which
the65Poole court relies in support of its holding actually contradicts
it.'
Cases from other jurisdictions occasionally deal with the issue
of notaries' perceptions of signers. 66 These cases, while not imposing a clear duty to judge competence or willingness, suggest that a
notary has such a legal duty.' 67 For example, in Richard v.
Smith, 65 the notary who notarized the transaction in question
stated she would not have notarized had she thought the signer to
be incompetent. 169 The court sanctioned the notary's conduct as
commendable, referring specifically to her statement regarding notarization for an incompetent signer.'70 Conversely, at least one
McQuatt, 69 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1946); Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Hoover, 231
N.E.2d 873 (Ohio 1967).
160. See supra note 36 for a list of the state notary law statutes and the required steps prior to a notarization.
161. Poole, 689 A.2d at 89 (Md. 1997).

162. Cf id.
163. Cf. id.
164. Id. at 86-89. The Poole court does not provide any criteria on which the
notary should base the decision of judging competence or willingness other
than using general observations. Id. at 89-90.
165. Id. at 87.
166. See generally Richard v. Smith, 361 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Ark. 1962)
(commending a notary for stating that the notary would not have gone for-

ward with the notarization if the notary had thought the signer incompetent).
167. Id. The court did not clearly set out a legal duty for notaries to make
judgments of competence or willingness. Id.
168. 361 S.W.2d 741 (Ark. 1962).
169. Id. at 743.
170. Id. The plaintiff was challenging a land conveyance and sought to void
the deed. Id. at 742-43. Shortly after the conveyance, the grantor contended
that he was not competent to enter into such transactions at the time of the
conveyance. Id. In fact, the grantor's doctor testified that the grantor was
unable to transact business on the date of the deed because the grantor could
not appreciate the value of anything at that time. Id. The court also considered the testimony of the clerk who recorded the deed and served as the notary public. Id. The notary testified that the appellant acted similarly to the
way most people act; therefore, he was competent at the time of the conveyance. Id. The court chose to follow the notary's judgment and upheld the
conveyance. Id. The court held the grantor possessed sufficient mental ca-
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court has held that "[a] notary's function is simply to certify the

validity of the signature; the notary does not attest to the validity
of the statements made in the document itself."'
Other courts have undermined the authority of notaries by
invalidating transactions where the notary and other witnesses
had differing views on a signer's competence, willingness, or
both."' For example, in Gifford v. Goesling'.' the court considered
whether a grantor had the appropriate mental capacity at the time
of making a conveyance. 7 4 After weighing the testimony of the notary, whom the court described as a "lay witness" against two of
the grantor's physicians, the court relied upon the physicians' testimony. 7 5 In fact, the notary even admitted she was not qualified
to determine the grantor's, competency. 6 The court relied on the
doctors' testimony and nullified the conveyance.'77 Similarly, in
pacity to convey the land because he could "retain in his memory without
prompting the extent and condition of his property and to comprehend how he
is disposing of it and to whom and upon what consideration .... " Id.
171. Butler v. Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc., 41 F.3d 285, 293-94 (7th Cir.
1994). The notary does not attest to any of the facts contained within the
document, but merely verifies that the signer is who he or she purports to be.
Id.
172. See, e.g., Clark v. Hackett, 674 So.2d 1306, 1309 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)
(proclaiming a notary's observations regarding a document signer's capacity to
be merely opinion); Daley v. Boroughs, 835 S.W.2d 858, 864-65 (Ark. 1992)
(giving no deference to the notary's testimony where the evidence regarding
the signer's capacity was contradictory); Anderson v. Anderson, 237 P.2d 24,
25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (relying on the testimony of a physician rather
than the notary who notarized the transaction); Hughes v. Grandy, 177 P.2d
939, 943-44 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (relying on the testimony of lay people
instead of the testimony of the notary public who notarized the conveyance);
Pearson v. Schubach, 763 P.2d 834, 836 & n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (noting
that the language which appears on a notary's acknowledgment declaring that
acknowledgment to be a free and voluntary act is only prima facie evidence of
the act being free and voluntary); Young v. Young, 82 S.E.2d 54, 57-58 (W.Va.
1954) (refusing to allow the notarized transfer of land to be upheld on the
grounds that the grantor was not competent).
173. 951 S.W.2d (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
174. Id. at 645.
175. Id. D.A. signed a power of attorney that enabled Mary to transact
business for him and also executed a quit-claim deed for his property. Id. at
643. Both of these instruments were signed in the presence of the notary and
Mary. Id. D.A.'s son challenged the grant of land claiming that D.A. was not
competent to enter into such transactions because of medical infirmities. Id.
Two of D.A.'s doctors testified that D.A. was not mentally competent to execute the deeds. Id. at 644. However, neither of the doctors were present at
the time of the transaction. Id. The court chose to rely on the testimony of
the doctors in place of the notary, and the court voided the conveyance of the
land. Id. at 645.
176. Id. The court noted that the notary's acknowledgment on the deeds
indicated that the conveyance was the grantor's free act. Id. The court noted
that this language on the acknowledgment was prima facie evidence that the
conveyance was the grantor's free act. Id.
177. Id. The court highlighted the fact that the notary spent very little time
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Anderson v. Anderson,' a court considered the testimony of the
notary who claimed that the grantor of property was mentally
competent. 179 The court, however, chose to rely on the testimony of
grant.18 0
the grantor's physician in affirming the nullification of the
Likewise, in Hughes v. Grandy,"' a notarized real estate conveyance was challenged.' 2 The court balanced the notary's testimony
with the testimony given by friends and relatives of the grantor in
considering whether the grantor was mentally competent at the
time of the conveyance.'83 The notary testified that he was with
the grantor for about 15 to 25 minutes and that she appeared competent.8 4 The court, however, upheld the trial court's decision and
held the grantor to be incompetent at the time of the conveyance."
with the grantor before the notarization. Id. The court also noted that the
notary's signature did not in any way indicate that the grantor was competent
to execute the deeds. Id.
178. 237 P.2d 24 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
179. Id. at 25. The plaintiff challenged the validity of a deed executed from
decedent to the defendant. Id. at 24. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent
was not mentally competent at the time of the grant, and the grant should be
voided. Id. The plaintiff presented evidence at trial which indicated that the
decedent had some difficulty with the English language. Id. The plaintiff also
presented evidence showing that the decedent confused the identity of his
children and was extremely irrational. Id. The evidence at trial also showed
that the decedent was "disoriented, complained of dizziness and pain, and was
unable to remember various things." Id. at 25.
180. Id. The court weighed the testimony of family members who observed
the decedent's conduct and his physician against the testimony of the notary
who notarized the deed. Id. The notary, who was also an attorney, stated
that the decedent appeared to be mentally competent. Id. However, the decedent's physician declared that the decedent was of unsound mind and not
competent to enter into such transactions. Id. The court relied on the physician and family members' testimony and voided the deed. Id.
181. 177 P.2d 939 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
182. Id. at 943. The decedent transferred property to the defendant and had
the transfer notarized. Id. The plaintiff challenged this transfer alleging that
the decedent was not mentally competent to enter into such transactions. Id.
at 941.
183. Id. at 943. Several friends, neighbors, and acquaintances of the decedent testified for the plaintiff. Id. The defendant relied heavily on the testimony of the notary who notarized the transaction. Id. The notary testified
that the decedent was "in first class mind, sound mind, and good memory."
Id. at 944. The notary also testified that the decedent was under no undue
influence at the time of the conveyance. Id. Another witness for the plaintiff
who had known the decedent for over a decade testified that the decedent was
of sound mind on the day of the grant. Id. at 943. Finally, two more witnesses
for the plaintiff testified that they noticed absolutely no difference in the decedent's conduct. Id.
184. Id. at 945. The court noted the very brief amount of time that the notary had to judge the decedent's actions. Id.
185. Id. at 943-44. Although the testimony was almost evenly divided, with
the notary believing the decedent competent, the court chose to void the conveyance. Id. at 944. The court placed no special emphasis or significance on
the notary's testimony. Id. Instead, the court relied on the testimony of peo-
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Further, in Pearson v. Schubach,'" the court noted that although a notary's acknowledgment proclaimed the notarized
document a "free and voluntary" act, the language was only prima
facie evidence of the willingness of the signer.'87 The court specifically stated that this language merely establishes a rebuttable
presumption. 8 8 The court did not rely on the notary's observations
to establish whether the act was actually free and voluntary.'89
In all of the aforementioned cases, the notary's signature on a
document is one of many factors considered by courts in determining a signer's competence or willingness. At best, the notary's observations are given relatively little weight in making such determinations, presumably because the notary was actually in the
presence of the signer at the moment when his or her willingness
or competence was to be judged. Courts often consider a number
of other factors as well, and often take the opposite position of the
notary. 990 Thus, it does not appear that most courts require notaries to judge competence or willingness because the courts are
quick to counter a notary's assertions.
D. Other Sources of Authority

A variety of other sources exist from which a notary could
seek guidance in interpreting the statutes that govern notary conduct.' 9' Included among the sources designed to aid notaries in
ple who had known the decedent for numbers of years. Id. See Clark v.
Hackett, 674 S.2d 1306, 1308 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995). Plaintiff had conveyed
some property to the defendant and sought to void the deed based on mistake
or fraud. Id. The plaintiff testified that he had no recollection of the conveyance and that he lacked the proper capacity to convey the property. Id. When
the notary who notarized the transaction was called to the hospital, he spoke
with several members of the hospital staff who assured him that the grantor
was mentally alert. Id. The court placed little weight on the notary's testimony. Id. at 1309. The court also noted that by no means is a notary's opinion regarding a grantor's competency necessarily conclusive on that matter.
Id. The court held that the notary's statements regarding the grantor's competency were merely contradictions and would not rely on the notary's observations. Id. The court refused to uphold the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant based on the notary's assertions. Id. The court
declared that a question of material fact existed regarding the plaintiffs mental capacity. Therefore, the court would not rely on the notary's judgment.

Id.
186. 763 P.2d 834 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
187. Id. at 836. The language in the notary's acknowledgment declared the
act which he was notarizing to be both "free and voluntary." Id. The court
noted that the notary was not using those terms based on the notary statute.
Id. Thus, the relevance of the language contained in the acknowledgment
created only a rebuttable presumption of truth. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 82 S.E.2d 54, 61 (W.Va. 1954) (declaring that
contradictory testimony of a notary was not reliable).
191. See Interview, supra note 17. Professor Closen noted that many nota-
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their duties are handbooks that are printed by the state agencies
that govern the notaries' commissions and publications by the National Notary Association (NNA) and the American Society of Notaries.192
Currently, the Model Notary Act contains no provisions explaining whether a notary should judge competence or willingness
of signers appearing before them. 93 This absence creates some
confusion regarding exactly how a notary should screen document
signers. However, the NNA has further confused the issue by declaring in its Code of Professional Responsibility that the notary is
under a duty to judge both competence and willingness of document signers. '9 Thus, the NNA contradicted itself by promulgating a Model Notary Act that is silent as to a notary's obligation of
judging competence and willingness,' 9' and a Code of Professional
Responsibility that' specifically charges a notary with such a
duty.'96 One would presume that the language of the Model Notary
Act would control a notary's conduct with the Code of Professional
Responsibility used merely as support for the model statute.'97
This presumption is valid since statutes ultimately govern a notary's conduct, 99 with other materials such as handbooks merely
serving to clarify uncertainties and provide notaries with guidance.'" Hence, in the NNA's idealized world, the notary's duties
are not only unclear, but also contradictory.

ries belong to organizations such as the National Society of Notaries or the
American Society of Notaries. Id.
192. Id. Some states do not print handbooks. Id. However, many of those
states advise new notaries that they should join either the National Notary
Association or the American Society of Notaries. Id.
193. MODEL NOTARY ACT (1984); UNIF. LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS §§ 1-13

(1983).
194. See NOTARY PUB. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note

5, at 10. This authority provides two illustrations specifically aimed at a notary's duty to judge competence and willingness. Id. In one example, this
authority proclaims that the notary should not notarize a document because
the signer was not in touch with reality. Id.
195. MODEL NOTARY ACT (1984).
196. See NOTARY Pus. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note

5, at 10.
197. Id. See also CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AM. SOC'Y

OF NOTARIES 1 (1980) (stating that a notary must be sure that the party that
is having a document notarized understands the contents of that document).
198. See Interview, supra note 17.
199. ALAsKA NOTARY PUB. HANDBOOK 15 (1997). This handbook specifically
states that notaries should not notarize when they feel the signer appearing
before them is incompetent and unwilling. Id. The handbook states that the
signer should "be able to communicate with [the notary] in some fashion and
to indicate a basic understanding of the document." Id. The handbook also
directs the notary to exercise common sense in determining whether a signer
is competent. Id.
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III. PROPOSED CLARIFICATIONS
The following facts are true: For 15 years, Bobby Joe Clardy
suffered from a recurrent manic depressive illness that was described as episodic. In order to control the condition, Bobby Joe
took lithium. One day, after discussing the required down payment with a dealer, Bobby Joe decided that he wanted to purchase
a new truck. Two days later, Bobby Joe's wife phoned the dealer
and said that Bobby Joe was incompetent and should not be conducting business. Not heeding this advice, the dealer decided to
proceed with the sale. 00 If you were a notary and asked to notarize
this transaction,would you do so?
This Part proposes additions and changes to the National Notary Association's Model Notary Act and its Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the American Society of Notaries Code of Professional Responsibility. The proposed statutory changes are set
out below in capitalized print.2 0 ' Further, like the committee comments accompanying many statutes, the proposed changes are
explained in the text accompanying those changes. 2 The explanation reveals the policy reasons that make the additions and
changes necessary.
ANY DOCUMENT BEARING A NOTARIZATION SHALL INDICATE
ONLY THAT THE NOTARY IDENTIFIED THE DOCUMENT SIGNER
THROUGH PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE. A
NOTARIZATION DOES NOT AND SHALL NOT REPRESENT THAT THE
NOTARY MADE ANY DETERMINATION OF EITHER THE COMPETENCE OR
WILLINGNESS OF THE SIGNER APPEARING BEFORE THE NOTARY.

The preceding language should be adopted and incorporated
into the NNA's Model Notary Act. Additionally, the proposed language should be substituted for the current provision in the NNA's
Code of Professional Responsibility stating that notaries should
judge competence and willingness of document signers. The pro:
posed language seeks to clearly define what is considered by a notary prior to performing a notarization. The concise language of
the proposal relieves notaries of any possible uncertainty regarding their notarial duties by unequivocally stating that notaries are
not required to judge competence or willingness of document signers. Once adopted, the proposed language clarifies any previous
uncertainty regarding a notary's duties and explains that signers
appearing before notaries are screened solely for identity. Additionally, the proposal will help to promote uniformity in notary
practice by specifically delineating exactly how notaries are to

200. Shoals Ford, Inc. v. Clardy, 588 So.2d 879, 880-81 (Ala. 1991). The
facts contained in the hypothetical are based on the actual facts of this case,
even though no notary was called upon to notarize the transaction. Id.
201. Gnoffo, supra note 128, at 1091.

202. Id.
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screen document signers.
Similarly, the American Society of Notaries also propounds a
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. ° In this, the American
Society of Notaries does not contend that notaries are charged
with the duty of judging either competence or willingness of document signers.25

However, as mentioned above,

in omitting a

statement which specifically proclaims that a notary screens a
document signer for identification and nothing more, the American
Society of Notaries has also contributed to the uncertainty surrounding notarizations. 27

By adopting the language proposed

above, the American Society of Notaries could explicate the duties
encompassing the office of the notary. Again, adoption of the proposal would effectively promote constancy in notary practice and
the reliance placed upon notarized documents.
IV. CONCLUSION
The following facts are true: Esther Neprozatis is an 81 year
old widow who lives alone with no close friends or relatives. During mid-January in Chicago, Esther called J&B Heating to inspect
the heater in her home. After informing Esther that she would
need a great deal of work done, including a new air conditioner, a
representative of J&B drove her to two different banks so that she
could make withdrawals to pay for repairs. All total, Esther paid
J&B over $25,000 for its services that were appraised at a fraction
of that value. °8 If you were a notary and Esther asked you to notarize this service contract, would you do so?

The five situations posed at the beginning of each section2
represent some of the difficult situations with which notaries may
be confronted. It should be noted that the courts which reviewed
those five situations invalidated all five transactions.2 10 However,

203. Id.
204. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF NOTARIES (May 4, 1980).

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. In Re Estate of Neprozatis, 378 N.E.2d 1345, 1346-47 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978). The facts contained in the hypothetical are based on the actual facts of

this case, even though no notary was called upon to notarize the transaction.
Id.
209. Notaries should notarize in all of the situations presented, because notaries have no duty to judge competence or willingness of document signers.

210. See Shoals Ford, Inc. v. Clardy, 588 So.2d 879, 885 (Ala. 1991) (voiding
a contract between two parties and levying punitive damages against one

party because of its pursuit of the contract after repeated warnings from people associated with the purchaser); Williamson v. Matthews, 379 So.2d 1245,
1248 (Ala. 1980) (canceling a real estate transaction because one of the parties
was not capable of contracting due in part to diminished capacity); Neprozatis,
378 N.E.2d at 1350-51 (rescinding a contract between an elderly widow and a
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if the notaries were actually asked to notarize those five documents, the notaries should have done so-except in Georgia,
Maryland, and possibly in Washington.
Although notaries were not actually asked to notarize any
documents in the five illustrations, notaries are often confronted
with such difficult circumstances. For example, 90 year old Adeline Fuoco transferred a parcel of land to her son and had a notary
attest to her signature on the transaction."' After Adeline's death,
the administrator of her estate challenged the transfer alleging
that Adeline was incompetent at the time of the execution of the
transfer.212 Similarly, a notary was presented with a difficult
situation where William Fisher wanted to amend his will and
leave everything to Joyce Ann Fortson.1 2 Joyce Ann had been one
of William's primary caregivers when he was diagnosed with terminal cancer a few weeks earlier.1 4 William and Joyce Ann were
heating company based on the fraud of the heating company and the exorbitant profits that it made at the widow's expense); Gordon v. Bialstoker Ctr.
and Bikur Cholim, Inc., 385 N.E.2d 285, 287 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that the defendant did not meet its burden of proving that the gift was freely and voluntarily made because of the existing relationship between the parties); Hodge
v. Shea, 168 S.E.2d 82, 83 (S.C. 1969) (invalidating a contract between the
parties based on the weakened condition of the granting party and the special
doctor and patient relationship that existed between the two parties).
211. Howe v. Johnston, 660 N.E.2d 380, 381 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). The decedent had transferred a parcel of real estate to her son three years before her
death at the age of 93. Id. The decedent was legally blind at the time of the
alleged conveyance. Id. The judge found that her judgment was impaired and
that her mental condition was weak at the time of the signing. Id. at 382. A
notary notarized the signature outside of the decedent's hospital room without
knowing whether or not she had actually signed the deed. Id. at 381.
212. Id. This case is different than many of the others mentioned in this
comment because the notary did not properly attest to the decedent's signature. Id. Instead of actually witnessing the decedent sign the deed and properly identifying her, the notary waited in the hall outside of the hospital room.
Id. This notarization was improper because the notary did not properly attest
to the decedent's signature. Id. Although the surrounding circumstances
shock the conscience, those circumstances alone would not have constituted
an improper notarization had the notary properly identified the decedent and
had her sign in his presence. Id.
213. Arnelle v. Fisher, 647 So.2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The
decedent was diagnosed with terminal cancer while a patient at a local hospital. Id. During his stay at the hospital, the decedent developed a relationship
with one of his nurses. Id. In the weeks following his discharge, the decedent
and the nurse often visited each other at home. Id. After a very brief courtship, the two moved in together. Id. The couple decided to get married and
had a notary perform the wedding ceremony. Id.
214. Id. The decedent contacted a notary who performed his wedding ceremony and later executed his will. Id. The will was executed one month after
the wedding ceremony and nine days before the decedent's death. Id. Friends
of the wife of the decedent witnessed the execution of the will. Id. The will
named the children of the wife of the decedent as beneficiaries to the decedent's estate, even though the decedent had only met the children on one occasion. Id.
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married shortly after his release from the hospital and remained
married for exactly 41 days before his death. 1 ' The administrator
16
of his estate challenged the will based on undue influence.
Both of the preceding examples along with the illustrations at
the start of each section demonstrate how notaries are frequently
confronted with difficult and sensitive situations. As Chief Judge
Desmond warned, "[w]ithout full knowledge of his powers, obligations and limitations, a notary public may be a positive danger to
the community in which he is licensed to act."6 7 Notaries must
know the limitations of their powers and duties in order to properly serve the public. Thus, notaries should not make determinations such as competence or willingness of document signers.

215. Id. Upon the decedent's death, the decedent's cousin filed a petition for
an annulment of the marriage, revocation of the will, determination of the
beneficiaries, an accounting, and the appointment of a new representative.
Id. The decedent's cousin contended that the decedent's wife had exerted undue influence over the decedent and had persuaded him to enter into both the
marriage and the subsequent will. Id.
216. Id. The court found that the marriage contract was merely voidable if
it was obtained through the undue influence of one of the parties. Id. at 1049.
The court also found that the decedent was of sufficient mental capacity to
enter into both the marriage contract and the will. Id.
217. Desmond, supra note 1, at 1.

